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Abstract
This paper addresses the trends and challenges of 2015 for social and economic policy 
in the near future. The analysis of the global crisis includes uneven developments between 
the leading advanced and emerging economies, new models of economic growth that look 
differently across different countries, the prospects of globalization and the challenges of 
³UHJLRQDOJOREDOL]DWLRQ´FXUUHQF\FRQ¿JXUDWLRQVRIWKHIXWXUHDQGHQHUJ\SULFHWUHQGV
DQGWKHLULQÀXHQFHRQWKHSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFSURVSHFWVRISDUWLFXODUVWDWHV7KHFXU-
rent challenges are discussed in the context of the previous 30 years. Among the main 
topics on Russia, there are approaches to a new growth model, structural transformation 
(including import-substitution issues), economic trends, budget and monetary outlines, 
and social issues. Priorities for economic policy are also a topic of discussion.
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWV
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.H\ZRUGV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*OREDOWUHQGV²WKHJHQHUDODQGWKHVSHFL¿F
Today, the world is looking for the new equilibrium that should occur after 
the global structural (systemic) crisis that began in 2008 and still more or less 
continues. We are witnessing the formation of a new macroeconomic (including 
the nature of monetary policy and economic growth potential) and institutional 
growth model, a change in the roles of certain economic sectors, the emergence 
of a new model for globalization and international trade, and a re-thinking of 
the role of inequality in the economic and social development of the leading 
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states.1 The situation remains unstable, although the global crisis itself is nearing 
completion.
Nevertheless, the end of the global crisis will not necessarily mean that 
the situation in all affected countries and regions will improve. It will depend 
RQ WKHDELOLW\RIFRXQWULHV WR³H[SORLW WKHFULVLV´ LH WR¿QG LQVWLWXWLRQDOVROX-
tions to help them adapt to the new reality — technological, economic, social, and 
even ideological. Some countries may come out of the crisis renewed and more 
competitive, but others will continue trying to overcome the negative trends. 
+RZHYHU WKLVZLOO QR ORQJHU EH D JOREDO FULVLV EXW UDWKHU D FULVLV RI VSHFL¿F
 national models.2
We can identify a number of features that were characteristic of the global 
crisis during the past year and that will remain relevant in 2016.
7KH¿UVWLVWKHVWDJHGQDWXUHDQGODFNRIJHRJUDSKLFDOV\QFKURQ\WRWKHJOREDO
crisis. Although the crisis affected almost all developed and leading emerging 
economies, its progress was asynchronous across the countries and regions of 
WKHZRUOG$W¿UVWLWVHHPHGWKDWWKHFULVLVPLJKWHQJXOIWKHPDMRULW\RIWKHOHDGLQJ
countries, and therefore, global economic coordination institutions were created 
LQWKH*ZDVIRUPHGDQGWKHPDQGDWHRIWKH)LQDQFLDO6WDELOLW\%RDUG
was expanded.
The decoupling hypothesis appeared, arguing that the leading developing 
countries were, to a certain degree, independent of the trends in developed count-
ries. This provided a basis for the idea that emerging economies would drive 
WKHZRUOG RXW RI WKHFULVLV 7KHKLJKHVW KRSHV OD\ ZLWK WKH%5,&6 FRXQWULHV
+RZHYHU WKHFULVLVVRRQEHJDQ WRDFFHOHUDWH LQ%UD]LODQG5XVVLDDQG WKHQ LQ
RWKHUPDMRUGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV,QLWEHFDPHFOHDUWKDWHYHQ&KLQDZDV
DIIHFWHGE\WKHFULVLVDVLWVJURZWKUDWHGURSSHGEHORZIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQ
\HDUVVLQFH$OWKRXJK&KLQDGHPRQVWUDWHVDKLJKUDWHRIJURZWKUHOD-
tive to other countries and that growth contributes much more to the global GDP 
than it did in the early 1980s, the impact of a slowdown will be felt globally. 
:HVKRXOG DOVRQRWH WKHXQSUHFHGHQWHGYRODWLOLW\RI WKH&KLQHVH VWRFNPDUNHW
the USD 513 billion contraction in international reserves, and the aggressive (on 
WKH&KLQHVHVFDOHPRYHPHQWVRIWKH\XDQ7KH%UD]LOLDQHFRQRP\LVDOVRGHFOLQ-
ing, and only India managed to keep growth at approximately 7.3%.
7KH%5,&6FRXQWULHVVKRZHGPRUHSROLWLFDOXQLW\ODVW\HDUDQGSURYLGHGLQ-
creasingly fewer reasons for economic positivism. The unity turned out to be 
more political than economic (as observed 15 years ago, when it was “invented” 
by J. O’Neil, chief economist at Goldman Sachs).
The second is overcoming the crisis by developed economies. The crisis is ag-
gravated in developing countries, whereas developed economies are recovering. 
First of all, we can point to the United States, where macroeconomic conditions 
(growth rates and low unemployment) enabled the Federal Reserve to increase 
LQWHUHVW UDWHV IRU WKH¿UVW WLPH LQQLQH\HDUV8QGRXEWHGO\ WKHFULVLV LVQRW\HW
over: past experience has proven that such large-scale transformations could 
 1 These issues are discussed in detail in Mau and Ulyukaev (2014).
 2 In fact, the crisis with the Soviet system during the 1980s and 1990s represented this particular kind of 
deferred crisis. It was a result of the failure of the Soviet elite to adapt to the new reality that emerged during 
the crisis in the 1970s. Thus, the crisis in the Soviet system was not part of the structural crisis in developed 
countries but undoubtedly arose as its consequence. 
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quite possibly lead to renewed deterioration in economic trends. This, however, 
does not change the general trend.
The Federal Reserve acted with caution because of the domestic situation 
(GDP and unemployment trends) and not as a result of evaluating this factor’s 
impact on other countries, which is tolerably in line with the point voiced by 
-&RQQHOO\866HFUHWDU\RIWKH7UHDVXU\GXULQJWKHGLVPDQWOLQJRIWKH%UHWWRQ
Woods system in 1971, “the dollar is our currency and your problem.” The turn-
around in US monetary policy supports the “escape to quality” trend (capital 
ÀLJKWIURPHPHUJLQJPDUNHWVDQGVHHPVWRKHUDOGWKHEHJLQQLQJRIDORQJSHULRG
of an expensive dollar. The latter will factor into amortizing one of the global 
imbalances that had formed before the outbreak of the global crisis.
The situation in the EU is improving gradually, which is caused, to a lesser ex-
tent, by general macroeconomic success and, to a greater extent, by the manifested 
ability to resolve acute issues with the single currency system. On the whole, 
the crisis with the single European currency (related to the situation in Greece) 
is resolved. The euro has persevered under the conditions of, and according to, 
WKHSDUDGLJPRI¿VFDODXVWHULW\WKH*HUPDQDSSURDFKDQGQRWRQWKHH[RWLFVRI
unfettered budget stimulation, as was advocated by the leftist Greek government 
and the govern ments of some southern European countries. At the same time, 
WKH(XURSHDQ&HQWUDO %DQN (&% LV FRQWLQXLQJ LWV SROLF\ RI VWURQJ TXDQWLWD-
tive easing, which now turns out to be just the opposite of the course taken by 
the Federal Reserve in 2015. The euro’s weakening against the dollar may be-
FRPHDQDGGLWLRQDOLQFHQWLYHIRUWKH(XURSHDQHFRQRP\LIWKHLQÀDWLRQWUDSFDQ
be avoided).
Ireland’s success was less noticeable, but still important: for three quarters 
in 2015, economic growth was 7%, the best performance in the Eurozone. This 
is the more important because in 2008 and 2009, Ireland suffered a deep crisis 
that brought it to the verge of economic disaster. The country’s experience over 
the past seven years shows that a responsible policy may resolve complicated 
issues, even within a currency union and with a lack of monetary tools at the dis-
posal of the national government.
+RZHYHU DQ RYHUHVWLPDWLRQ RI WKHUHFXSHUDWLRQ LQ WKH(XUR]RQH ZRXOG EH
a mistake. It still requires a number of institutions to ensure its stable function-
ing, including banking regulations and budget system coordination. The results 
RIWKHUHIHUHQGXPLQ*UHDW%ULWDLQFRQFHUQLQJLWVPHPEHUVKLSLQWKH(8DUHVWLOO
open. Europe has not overcome the crisis for economic and political reasons.
The medium-term prospects for the unprecedented monetary expansionism of 
UHFHQW\HDUVLVVWLOODQRSHQLVVXH$OWKRXJKGHÀDWLRQUHPDLQVWKHSULPDU\WKUHDW
IRU GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV WKHULVNV RI DFFHOHUDWHG LQÀDWLRQ SURFHVVHV FDQQRW EH
ignored.
The prospects for overcoming the immigration crisis in Europe are closely re-
lated to this matter. The wave of migrants into the EU raises serious short-term 
issues. The same wave, however, can offer additional possibilities to neutralize 
the negative demographic trends and increase productivity.
The third is the search for and development of new economic growth models. 
:HVKRXOGVHHNPXOWLSOHQHZPRGHOVUDWKHUWKDQDVLQJOHRQHVL]H¿WVDOODS-
proach. Even with some convergence between developed and leading developing 
countries during the pre-crisis period (the 1990s and 2000s), the challenges fac-
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LQJWKHPQRZGLIIHUVLJQL¿FDQWO\7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHRQJRLQJVWUXFWXUDO
crisis and those of the 1930s and 1970s is the different scope of macroeconomic 
and institutional reforms needed to achieve a sustainable growth trajectory.3
For some countries, it should be about the economy’s greater focus on domes-
WLFGHPDQGWKLVSHUWDLQVWRTXLWHGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVVXFKDV*HUPDQ\DQG&KLQD
For others, the focus should be on enhancing and diversifying foreign demand 
(this also pertains to Russia). A number of countries need serious institutional 
UHIRUPV 6RPH FRXQWULHV QHHG WR UDLVH SULFHV WR DFKLHYH WKHUHTXLUHG LQÀDWLRQ
targets, whereas others need to suppress them. Nevertheless, all countries need to 
take measures to enhance economic growth potential given a new technological 
base. In virtually all of the growth models, human capital development is one of 
the key priorities.
The fourth is the prospect for globalization. Globalization faces serious chal-
lenges, economic and political alike. International trade value declined by 11% 
in 2015. This has been a rare occurrence during the past 30 years, nearly un-
precedented, overlooking 2008, when the 22.6% decline was fully offset by 2010.
We have seen the evident enhancement of political forces arguing for protect-
ing national values and identity, in contrast to universalism and globalization. All 
this is happening against a backdrop of greater rigidity in international relations, 
including crude protectionism, sanctions, aggressive regulation, and even armed 
FRQÀLFWVDOORIZKLFKKDGEHHQDOPRVWXQDFFHSWDEOHXQWLOUHFHQWO\$FUXFLDODO-
beit not entirely clear, question is what will become of the political mainstream. 
A related question is whether the trend towards nationalism, which was margin-
alized in recent decades (since the end of World War II in Europe), will prevail 
during the next quarter of a century.4
From an economic point of view, globalization is one of the key phenomena 
DQGZLOOUHPDLQVRLQWKHSRVWFULVLVZRUOG+RZHYHUWKHUHFHQWWUHQGWRZDUGVDG-
justing the globalization model is becoming increasingly apparent. We are speak-
ing about the shift of the center of gravity from “global globalization” (which has 
the WTO as its symbol and quintessence) towards “globalization by interests” or 
regions. Regionalization of globalization has recently gained fresh momentum.
The expansion of the multilateral (universal) integration agenda in the world 
will apparently experience long-term stagnation: the WTO can provide only libe-
UDOL]DWLRQRIJOREDOWUDGHWRDFHUWDLQGHJUHHDQGGH¿QHWKHDFFHSWDEOHERXQGDULHV
RI SURWHFWLRQLVP EH\RQGZKLFK WKHJOREDO HFRQRP\ZLOO QRWPRYH%DVLFDOO\
the architecture of trade and economic relations will be determined by regional and 
mega-regional blocs, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
WKH7UDQV3DFL¿F 3DUWQHUVKLS 733 WKLV WUHDW\ ZDV VLJQHG LQ )HEUXDU\ 
WKH6LON5RDG(FRQRPLF%HOW65(%WKH(XUR$VLDQ(FRQRPLF8QLRQ($(8
and other treaties on free trade.
This is manifested in the development of existing and newly emerging trade and 
economic alliances as well as increased interest in inter-country free trade zones. 
,QWKHPRYHPHQWWRIRUPWKH65(%JDLQHGQHZPRPHQWXPDQGHFRQRPLF
 3 http://www.mirprognozov.ru/prognosis/economics/neft-skoro-zakonchitsya-syirevyie-tsiklyi/ru.
 4 “We may be entering a world dominated by a new paradigm where politicians, including central banks, have 
fewer opportunities to reduce risks. This suggests the possible beginning of a process by which a number of 
HDUOLHUDVVXPSWLRQVZLOOQRORQJHUEHUHOHYDQW´ZURWH&LWLDQDO\VWV&LWL*36S
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DQGSROLWLFDOWLHVDOVRVWUHQJWKHQHGZLWKLQWKH6&2DQG%5,&6,Q2FWREHUQH-
gotiations concluded on formation of the TPP, which involved the United States, 
-DSDQ&DQDGD0H[LFR$XVWUDOLD1HZ=HDODQG6LQJDSRUH%UXQHL&KLOH3HUX
Malaysia, and Vietnam.
The expansion of the EAEU, joined by Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, should be 
YLHZHGZLWKLQWKHVDPHFRQWH[W$GPLWWHGO\WKHLQWHQVL¿FDWLRQRISRVW6RYLHWLQ-
tegration processes and the trend towards a common economy, which occurred 
DERXW¿YH\HDUVDJRSURYHGWREHYHU\ZHOOWLPHG)XUWKHUGHYHORSPHQWVVKRZHG
the error of interpreting this policy as a “look back,” i.e., an attempt to restore 
the Soviet Union. Even recognizing the Soviet nostalgia prevalent in certain parts 
of the Russian elite, the establishment of the EAEU addressed not the issues of 
WKHSDVWEXWWKHFKDOOHQJHVRIWKHIXWXUHUHÀHFWLQJWKHQHZWUHQGWRZDUGVWKH³UH-
gionalization of globalization.”
7KH¿IWK LV WKHIRUPDWLRQ RI IXWXUH FXUUHQF\ FRQ¿JXUDWLRQV Expectations of 
the imminent collapse of the US dollar, popular among journalists for a certain 
period of time, have not come true, and the dollar apparently will continue to 
serve as the global reserve currency. The outcome of the 2015 European crisis in-
dicates that the euro is also likely to retain its status as an international currency. 
7KLVLVHYLGHQFHGE\WKHUHVROXWLRQRIWKHFULVLVLQ*UHHFH+RZHYHU(XUR]RQH
FRXQWULHV ZLOO KDYH WR PDNH VRPH GLI¿FXOW LQVWLWXWLRQDO GHFLVLRQV FRQFHUQLQJ
WKHEXGJHWDQGRWKHU¿QDQFLDOPDWWHUVWRHQDEOHWKHHXURWREHFRPHDIXOOÀHGJHG
international currency.
Despite — or, perhaps, thanks to — the 2015 devaluation, the yuan is moving 
in the direction of becoming a reserve currency. This is also facilitated by its 
inclusion in the IMF “currency basket.” A weaker currency provides competi-
tive advantages for an economy, which is important for the sustainable economic 
development of a country largely focused on exports.
Despite its high volatility, the ruble could still be regarded as a regional reserve 
FXUUHQF\%\VWDELOL]LQJWKHUXEOHDQGJLYLQJXSHOHPHQWVRIPRQHWDU\FRQWURO
Russian monetary authorities are laying the foundation for improving its interna-
tional position in the future. It is important for this task to maintain its critical fo-
cus, although its practical implementation has been postponed and is inseparable 
from serious structural and institutional reforms within the country.
The sixth is the decrease in commodity prices, particularly for fuel and ener-
gy products. The average annual oil price dropped by 50% compared with 2014. 
A drop of this magnitude over one year’s time has almost no precedent in modern 
history: in the past 50 years, this only occurred in 1986 and 2009 (Fig.  1 and 
)LJ,QWKH¿UVWFDVHLWIRUHVKDGRZHGWKHEHJLQQLQJRIDORQJSHULRGRIORZ
oil prices, though they rose slightly in the short term. The situation in 2008 
and 2009 may also have indicated a future change in the trend, which became 
PRUHDSSDUHQW LQDQG+RZHYHU WKLVVXJJHVWVQR¿UPFRQFOXVLRQV
as the history of oil price cycles is very short and we cannot build responsible 
forecasts based on two waves.
0RUHRYHUZHVWLOOGRQRWNQRZZKHWKHUÀXFWXDWLRQVLQWKHRLOPDUNHWIROORZ
DZDYHOLNHSDWWHUQ'HPDQGIRURLODVDFRPPRGLW\LVLQÀXHQFHGE\WHFKQRORJL-
cal progress, and it is far from certain that oil as a fuel will always be in demand 
during an economic recovery. It is possible that the “oil supercycle” mentioned 
so often in recent years is only a phenomenon of a certain phase of technologi-
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cal progress during the last half of the 20th and early 21st century (a mature 
industrial society that is becoming post-industrial). It is the high demand for oil 
that made its price an indicator of not only the economic but also the political 
well-being of many countries, including both producers and consumers, and 
the movements of oil prices determined the fate of political regimes and even 
social systems. When the technological model is changed, oil may once again 
become an ordinary exchange commodity needed in the energy and chemical 
LQGXVWULHVDQGFRXOGORVHWKHSROLWLFDOVLJQL¿FDQFHWKDWKDVEHHQDWWDFKHGWRLW
over the past 40 years.
Low commodity prices can result from powerful technological advances that 
ORZHUWKHGHPDQGIRUVSHFL¿FZHLJKWRIPHWDOVDQGIXHOVLQWKHSURGXFWLRQRI
modern products. Demand for new products (advanced metals and fuels) is driven 
by advanced technologies. If this assumption proves to be reasonable, there may 
be no new cyclical recovery of prices for traditional commodities.
Fig. 1. Global oil price (USD/barrel).
6RXUFH International Monetary Fund.
Fig. 2.&KDQJHVLQWKHJOREDORLOSULFHVRIWKHSUHYLRXV\HDU
6RXUFH International Monetary Fund.
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These are just assumptions, however. The practical conclusion is that an eco-
nomic policy cannot be based on an expected resumption of high oil prices or on 
maintaining a consistently low level. The only thing we can assume is that oil 
SULFHVÀXFWXDWHZLWKLQDYDU\LQJUDQJHGHSHQGLQJRQWKHLQWHUDFWLRQRIPXOWLSOH
hard-to-predict parameters. The less a country’s economy depends on market 
ÀXFWXDWLRQVEH\RQG WKHFRQWURO RI LWV QDWLRQDO JRYHUQPHQW WKHEHWWHU WKHSURV-
pects for sustainable economic growth over the long term. Norway is the most 
obvious example of this policy, with its oil rent concentrated in a sovereign 
fund. At the other end of the spectrum is Venezuela, which spent much of its oil 
rent proceeds: its GDP fell by 10% in 2015 (Table 1). Generally, economic out-
comes during 2015 clearly demonstrate that commodity price movements are not 
DGRPLQDQWJURZWKIDFWRUHYHQLQFRXQWULHVZLWKDVLJQL¿FDQWVKDUHRIFRPPR
dity sectors. The quality of institutions is much more important.
Low commodity prices will contribute to an even greater divergence between 
leading countries, both developed and developing. For commodity importers, 
LWZLOOEHFRPHDIDFWRU LQHFRQRPLFJURZWK IRUH[SRUWHUV LWZLOOEHDVRXUFH
Table 1
Macroeconomic indicators for selected countries in 2014 and 2015.
&RXQWU\ 
group of countries
GDP growth 
rate, %
,QÀDWLRQUDWH 
%
National debt,  
% of GDP
%XGJHWEDODQFH
% of GDP
2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015
World total 3.4 3.1 3.2 3.6 79.8 80.7 –3.1 –3.6
Developed economies 1.8 1.9 0.7 0.8 104.6 104.5 –3.4 –3.1
Developing economies 4.6 4.0 5.1 5.7 41.4 44.4 –2.6 –4.3
G7 1.7 1.9 0.8 0.7 118.6 117.4 –4.0 –3.5
EU 1.5 1.9 0.0 0.6 88.1 87.7 –2.9 –2.5
United Kingdom 2.9 2.2 0.9 0.3 89.4 88.9 –5.7 –4.2
France 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.1 95.6 97.1 –4.0 –3.8
Germany 1.6 1.5 0.2 0.2 74.6 70.7 0.3 0.5
Italy –0.4 0.8 –0.1 1.9 132.1 133.1 –3.0 –2.7
Spain 1.4 3.2 –1.0 0.7 97.7 98.6 –5.8 –4.4
Ireland 5.2 4.8 0.2 0.2 107.6 100.6 –4.0 –2.0
Poland 3.4 3.5 –1.0 0.1 50.1 51.1 –3.2 –2.8
Greece 0.8 –2.3 –2.6 1.5 177.1 197.0 –3.9 –4.2
Norway 2.2 0.9 2.1 2.3 28.1 28.1 8.8 6.0
Switzerland 1.9 1.0 –0.3 –1.2 46.3 46.2 –0.1 –0.2
USA 2.4 2.5 0.6 0.9 104.8 104.9 –4.1 –3.8
&DQDGD 2.5 1.2 1.9 1.1 87.9 90.4 –1.6 –1.7
Australia 2.7 2.4 1.6 2.4 33.9 36.0 –2.8 –2.4
Saudi Arabia 3.6 3.4 2.4 2.1 1.6 6.7 –3.4 –21.6
%5,&6 5.7 4.7 44.7 47.3 –2.6 –3.8
%UD]LO 0.1 –3.8 6.4 9.3 65.2 69.9 –6.2 –7.7
India 7.3 7.3 5.3 5.4 66.1 65.3 –7.0 –7.2
&KLQD 7.3 6.9 1.5 1.8 41.1 43.2 –1.2 –1.9
South Africa 1.5 1.3 5.8 5.5 46.0 48.4 –3.8 –4.1
Argentina 0.5 0.4 23.9 19.3 45.3 52.1 –2.7 –4.9
Venezuela –4.0 –10.0 68.5 190.0 51.8 53.0 –15.0 –24.4
EAEU 1.0 –3.1 18.4 21.2 –0.8 –5.3
Russia 0.6 –3.7 11.4 12.9 17.8 20.4 –1.2 –5.7
%HODUXV 1.6 –3.6 16.2 16.9 40.5 40.4 0.2 –2.4
Kazakhstan 4.3 1.5 7.4 9.0 14.9 18.3 1.8 –3.2
Ukraine –6.8 –9.0 24.9 45.8 71.2 94.4 –4.5 –4.2
6RXUFHWorld economic outlook database, October 2015. 
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of crisis that will need to be addressed with structural reforms, some of which 
will be painful, socially as well as politically. They are highly likely to be de-
layed, but the price of delaying reforms may turn out to be very high in terms of 
political and economic stability, which was clearly demonstrated by the Soviet 
experience.
The seventh is the prospects for the social structure of developed countries 
and the problem of inequality. Studies show the existence of social shifts lead-
ing to the polarization of society and an erosion of the middle class. Much has 
been written about the middle class amid the transformational crisis in Russia. 
Last year, discussions began regarding the impact of the recession on the middle 
class in 2014 and 2015. In the broader context, this problem is related to deep 
structural transformations inherent in the global crisis. Although a powerful 
middle class is forming in developing countries, developed countries are witness-
LQJDGLOXWLRQRIWKHPLGGOHFODVVDQGLQFUHDVHVLQWKHSURSRUWLRQVRIPRUHDIÀXHQW
strata, on the one hand, and of poorer people, on the other. This is largely con-
nected with the profound changes in the technological structure, with the division 
RISURIHVVLRQVLQWRPRUHDGYDQFHGDQG¿QDQFLDOO\DWWUDFWLYHDUHDV¿QDQFH,&7
ELRWHFKQRORJ\DSDUWIURPWUDGLWLRQDO¿HOGVZKHUHLQFRPHLVQRWJURZLQJ
At the beginning of the 21st century, and especially in the early years of 
the global crisis, researchers sought to determine the top 1% of the population 
who concentrated wealth in their hands.5 There has been an increasing amount of 
discussion lately about the formation of considerably large segments of the rich 
and the poor, with the middle class being diluted. In 2015, J. Furman, Obama’s 
chief economic adviser, said, “You have seen a hollowing out of the middle of the 
income distribution, and there’s neither one cause for it nor a single answer. It’s 
a big problem, it is decades in the making, and it will require a lot of solutions” 
(Fleming and Donnan, 2015).6 This shift is partly evidenced by the labor market 
VWUXFWXUHLQWKHPRGHUQ8QLWHG6WDWHVLWLVPXFKHDVLHUWR¿QGDORZSD\LQJMRE
for a person with a low level of education, or a high-paying job for a graduate of 
a top university, than a mid-level job that would be most in line with the concept 
of the middle class (Thompson, 2010).
6RFLDO VWUDWL¿FDWLRQ LQHTXDOLW\ DQG WKHLPSDFW RQ SURVSHFWV IRU HFRQRPLF
growth in developed countries will apparently be among the key topics of eco-
nomic and political discourse in the coming years. These issues are important 
not only in terms of creating a contemporary model of economic growth but also 
for ascertaining the more general prospects for preserving the socio-economic 
system currently known as capitalism. Some of the leading modern social scien-
tists consider the erosion of the middle class as a deferred realization of Marx’s 
forecast about the ejection of workers from the labor process, underlying his con-
clusion about the doom of social relations based on commodity production (see 
&ROOLQVS±
The eighth is the substantial increase in global tension, particularly the en-
KDQFHGXVHRIWKHPLOLWDU\WRUHVROYHFRQÀLFWV7KHQXPEHURIFRQÀLFWVKDVEHHQ
 5 See, e.g., Alvaredo et al. (2013), Mankiw (2013).
 6 Whereas in 1970, US middle-class households accounted for 62% of the total income, in 2014, they only 
DFFRXQWHGIRU+RZHYHUWKHVKDUHRIWKHXSSHUPLGGOHFODVVURVHIURPWRGXULQJWKHVDPHSHULRG
3HZ5HVHDUFK&HQWHU
990DX5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
steadily rising over the past three years. In a sense, it has become a political se-
TXHOWRWKHJOREDOFULVLV,WLVDV\HWGLI¿FXOWWRIXOO\HVWLPDWHWKHUHDOSURVSHFWV
IRUDUPHGFRQÀLFWDVDQLQGLVSHQVDEOHIDFWRULQVRFLRHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOOLIH
In summarizing the above, we can draw two conclusions about the develop-
ment of the global situation. From a purely economic point of view, it is develop-
ing positively. The global crisis is coming to an end, and the growth rates of 
the world economy and most of the world’s leading regions are recovering, albeit 
UHODWLYHO\VORZO\DQGXQHYHQO\DFURVVFRXQWULHVDQGUHJLRQV%DUULQJPDMRUWXU-
PRLOLQ&KLQDWKRVHULVNVDUHUHODWHGWRERWKHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOIDFWRUVZH
will see a gradual return to a normal, non-crisis economic and political agenda. 
7KHSUREOHPVIRULQGLYLGXDOFRXQWULHVHJ5XVVLD%UD]LODQG9HQH]XHODZKHUH
WKHSURFHVVHVRIVWUXFWXUDOPRGHUQL]DWLRQZLOOEHGHOD\HGZLOOQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\
impede the ability to overcome the structural crisis.
+RZHYHUWKHVHFRPSOHWHO\SHDFHIXOSURVSHFWVDUHEHLQJRYHUVKDGRZHGE\GH-
stabilizing political and military factors. Governments of the leading countries 
have become increasingly active in resorting to military force to address the chal-
lenges they face. This, in turn, dramatically increases risks, and not just economic 
ones. In other words, the risk of uncontrollable developments is increasing, which 
further enhances the role of non-economic factors in the implementation and ef-
¿FLHQF\RIHFRQRPLFSROLFLHV,QSUDFWLFHLWKDVQRDGYDQWDJHRYHUWKHUHVROXWLRQ
of military and occasional foreign policy objectives.
2. Russian anti-crisis policy
In 2015, the economic situation in Russia was driven by two groups of factors. 
On the one hand, it was the continued effect of the external shocks, including 
VDQFWLRQV HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUDQGIDOOLQJSULFHV IRUNH\5XVVLDQ
export products. On the other hand, there were apparent and serious structural 
problems that have reduced growth potential since the middle of the past decade 
and have caused stagnation in the Russian economy.
%RWKJURXSVRIIDFWRUVOHGWRWKHQHJDWLYHWUHQGVWKDWDSSHDUHGDVHDUO\DV
ZKLFKZDV UHÀHFWHG LQ WKH*'3GHFOLQH LQ  7DEOH$OPRVW DOO H[SHUWV
 acknowledge that as important as the external shocks were, the structural crisis 
was the key problem. Indeed, a decrease in investment activity has been observed 
since 2012, when growth rates began to decline. These negative processes started 
before the sanctions and falling oil prices. The reason behind this slowdown was 
WKHGHFUHDVHGHFRQRPLFJURZWKSRWHQWLDO¿UVWREVHUYHGGXULQJWKHVHFRQGKDOIRI
WKHV6LQHOQLNRY0XU\OHYHWDO2UORYDDQG(JLHY
Experience shows that external shocks should be addressed with monetary and 
¿VFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ&DVKLQMHFWLRQVLQVXFKDVLWXDWLRQZRXOGOHDGWRLQFUHDVLQJ
LQÀDWLRQDQGXQGHUPLQH²UDWKHUWKDQVWLPXODWH²LQYHVWPHQWDFWLYLW\$KHDOWK\
H[SDQVLRQRIEXGJHWIXQGLQJLVDOVRYHU\GLI¿FXOWGXHWRWKHVKDUSGHFOLQHLQEXG-
get revenues as the demand for military funding is increasing.
In December 2014, the situation seemed to be on the verge of disaster. The ruble 
fell rapidly following the imposition of external sanctions and the decline of oil 
prices, and monetary authorities opted to hold the reserves, rather than spending 
them to maintain the national currency. The budget, which the parliament just 
adopted, was becoming unrealistic before our very eyes.
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Due to the anti-crisis policies implemented throughout 2015, the results for 
the year look somewhat better than expected at the end of 2014. The worst-case 
VFHQDULRVKDYHQRWPDWHULDOL]HG7KHWLPHO\WUDQVLWLRQWRDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWH
FDOOHGDWUDQVLWLRQWR³LQÀDWLRQWDUJHWLQJ´ WKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRIEXGJHWH[SHQ-
ditures and the implementation of the government’s anti-crisis plan prevented 
the situation from spinning out of control, preserved the international reserves, 
DQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\VORZHGWKH*'3VOXPS
In the following discussion, we will study the main economic and political 
problems and solutions from 2015 and their impact on the prospects for the count-
ry’s socio-economic development.
Economic trends. GDP declined by 3.7% in 2015. This is the second recession 
since 1999, when the Russian economy shrank by 7.8% in the wake of the global 
FULVLV)LJ+RZHYHUZKHUHDV LQ WKHGHFOLQHRFFXUUHGLQ WKHPDMRULW\
of developed countries, growth is now accelerating there. Throughout the year, 
statesmen and experts discussed the “passing of the bottom” of the recession, i.e., 
the point at which it should stop (Table 3).
Two important factors drove the nature and duration of the downturn in 
DQGPDGHLWGLI¿FXOWWRSUHGLFWLHWKHLQGXVWU\VWUXFWXUHDQGH[FKDQJH
rate trends. The changing terms of trade — and, as a consequence, the deva-
luation of the national currency7 — had different effects on particular indust-
ries, which showed differing trends over the past year. Export-oriented indust-
ries demonstrated growth, whereas those associated primarily with domestic 
consumption shrank. The hardest blow, however, was dealt to those industries 
WKDWKDGSUHYLRXVO\EHQH¿WHGPRVWIURPWKHLQÀRZRIUHQWDOLQFRPHLHVHU-
vices, trade, and construction. Indeed, an analysis of the problems associated 
ZLWK WKH'XWFK GLVHDVH KDV VKRZQ WKDW D SRZHUIXO LQÀRZ RI UHQWDO LQFRPH
undermines competition in most industries producing tradable goods but con-
tributes to the development of sectors in which there are no imports (trade, 
FRQVWUXFWLRQ¿QDQFLDODQGQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHUYLFHV$FFRUGLQJO\WKHUHFDQEH
no import substitution there. Those sectors grew at an especially rapid pace in 
 7 To learn more about the mechanics of those changes, see Idrisov et al. (2015b). 
Fig. 3. Russian GDP (%).
6RXUFH Rosstat.
1390DX5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
WKHSDVW+RZHYHU IRU WKHVDPHUHDVRQ LW LV WKHVHVHFWRUV WKDWDUHPRVWVXV-
ceptible to decreased demand as a result of the devaluation. Without a doubt, 
the trend in each particular sector was strongly affected by the share of incom-
ing imported goods and the high proportion of borrowings in foreign curren-
cies within the sector8.
A combination of those factors drove the GDP trend. When the devaluation 
processes had stalled by mid-2015, industry began to show signs of recovery. 
+RZHYHUDQHZURXQGRIRLOSULFHGHFOLQHVDQGWKHIXUWKHUZHDNHQLQJRIWKHUXEOH
that followed, prolonged the recession.
The investment situation evolved similarly, which appeared to be stabilized 
E\WKHHDUO\DXWXPQ+RZHYHUWKHXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHH[FKDQJHUDWHDQGDF-
cordingly, the effectiveness of the business environment, has led to a continued 
decline in investment.
We can assume that in the absence of political shocks, a new equilibrium will 
be achieved in several months. In terms of macroeconomic factors, to restore 
growth, Russia needs neither high nor low, but stable, oil prices to determine 
clear conditions for businesses to make decisions.
Structural policies and import substitution. In the past (this applies not only 
to Russia), the consequences of devaluation were deferred, but the main results 
ZHUH DOUHDG\ YLVLEOH GXULQJ WKH¿UVW \HDU +RZHYHU LQ WKHFRQWH[W RI PRGHUQ
multi lateral devaluations and the global contraction of demand, their effect will 
be uneven across countries and will be deferred, at best, if the devaluation can be 
enhanced with relevant structural reforms. This has been demonstrated by the ex-
 8 See Idrisov (2015), Idrisov et al. (2015a).
Table 3
Industrial production: passing the low point in 2015 (%).
 Industry Share in 
the industrial 
production  
index
³%RWWRP´SDVVHG &KDQJHLQ
the output index, 
October 2015 
against July 2014
Industrial production index  ¥-XQH 96.19
Mining and minerals 33.99 ¥0D\ 101.31
Manufacturing  52.50 ¥-XO\ 93.44
LQFOXGLQJ    
Food products, beverages and tobacco 17.05 101.65
Textiles and textile products 1.43 83.88
Leather, leather products and footwear 0.32 ¥-XQH 89.60
Wood processing and wood products 2.20 95.92
Pulp and paper 3.92 ¥0D\ 96.81
&RNHSHWUROHXPSURGXFWV 18.78 100.09
&KHPLFDOSURGXFWLRQ 7.46 ¥QRUHGXFWLRQ 107.61
Rubber and plastic products 2.26 ¥0D\ 95.90
Other non-metal mineral products 4.41  86.90
Metallurgy and metal products 17.23 92.39
Machinery and equipment 6.24 ¥-XO\ 86.84
Electrical and optical equipment 6.05  84.04
Transport vehicles and equipment 7.06 ¥-XO\ 81.18
Other production 5.59  87.58
Electricity, gas and water 13.51  98.00
6RXUFHRosstat.
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perience of many countries, the most prominent being Japan, which failed to start 
the growth mechanism in this way.
The effect of import substitution is important and possible, but it is not straight-
IRUZDUGRUDXWRPDWLF7KHIROORZLQJDUHWKHUHDVRQVEHKLQGWKHPRGL¿HGLPSDFW
of devaluation on economic growth:
x the structural effects of a long period of Dutch disease physically degrades 
manufacturing businesses (and related labor resources), which could become 
a source of import substitution: they simply cease to exist and cannot recover 
automatically. Therefore, recovery primarily concerns export sectors that have 
WKHDELOLW\WRH[SDQGSURGXFWLRQZLWKRXWVLJQL¿FDQWLQYHVWPHQW
x in the absence of free capacity, import substitution requires investment and, 
consequently, a healthy investment climate. Devaluation could, to a certain 
H[WHQW FRPSHQVDWH IRU WKHSRRUEXVLQHVV FOLPDWHE\ UHGXFLQJ WKHULVNSUR¿W
UDWLR+RZHYHUZKHQPDNLQJLQYHVWPHQWLHORQJWHUPGHFLVLRQVGHYDOXD-
WLRQLVQRWWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDUJXPHQW
x devaluation makes the country more attractive for foreign investment. 
+RZHYHU5XVVLD¶VVLWXDWLRQLVFXUUHQWO\DJJUDYDWHGE\WKHVDQFWLRQV
x the country’s involvement in international trade (global value chains) also 
OLPLWVWKHSRWHQWLDOEHQH¿WIURPGHYDOXDWLRQDVVRPHRIWKHFRVWFRPSRQHQWV
are increasing as a result. Thus, the impact of devaluation on import substitu-
WLRQFDQEHGLVFXVVHGRQO\VXEMHFWWRDFRUUHFWDQDO\VLVRIVSHFL¿FVHFWRUVDQG
products.
$VDUHVXOWWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WREHQH¿WIURPGHYDOXDWLRQDURVHRQO\ZLWKLQVSH-
FL¿F VHFWRUV LQ 7KH\ DUH SULPDULO\ DVVRFLDWHGZLWK H[SRUWV$W WKHVDPH
time, the devaluation helped identify weak spots and revealed the excessive de-
pendence on imports for a number of manufacturing businesses and certain areas 
of the consumer market. The business models based on foreign exchange loans 
and related purchases of imported equipment began to collapse.
A government commission to support import substitution was established in 
DVZDVWKH5XVVLDQ([SRUW&HQWHUWRVXSSRUWQRQFRPPRGLW\H[SRUWV$Q
understanding of the nature and mechanics of this support formed gradually. 
President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev spoke unam-
biguously in favor of linking import substitution support with the ability to make 
products that would be competitive on foreign markets (Medvedev, 2015, p. 120). 
This means that the government is aware of the risk (known from the experience 
of a number of countries, particularly in Latin America) that import substitution 
could actually mean closing off the market to foreign goods and forcing domes-
tic consumers to purchase more expensive and inferior goods produced within 
the country.
Throughout 2015, attempts were made to limit the exports of goods that 
EHQH¿WHGIURPGHYDOXDWLRQHJJUDLQPHWDOVFKHPLFDOV7KLVDUJXPHQWZDV
the concern about the physical scarcity of goods for domestic consumption and 
the idea that exporting those goods would lead to higher domestic prices. (In fact, 
these are the same argument, only in the former case it acts as the “phantom pain” 
of the Soviet-era shortages, whereas in the latter, it was embedded in the mar-
NHWHFRQRP\UKHWRULF+RZHYHUQRWDQJLEOHDFWLRQZDVWDNHQLQWKLVDUHD2QO\
the ban on the exports of hides and skins was extended, and a ban on the export 
of wastepaper was imposed in December.
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Fiscal policy. In the face of external shocks, the government pursued a pru-
GHQW¿VFDOSROLF\DOWKRXJKLWFDQQRWHQWLUHO\EHFDOOHGFRQVHUYDWLYH7KHIHGH
UDO EXGJHW GH¿FLW WRWDOHG RI WKH*'3 FRPSDUHGZLWK  LQ  DQG
national debt remained at 14.3% — a very low value by all international stan-
dards — whereas foreign debt actually decreased slightly (obviously as a result of 
WKHVDQFWLRQVUDWKHUWKDQFRQVFLRXV¿VFDOFRQVHUYDWLVP
With export revenues declining, the Russian government should have adjusted 
the federal budget to reduce expenditures in February and March 2015. A 10% 
sequestration was selected as the appropriate tool. Technically, it was the simplest 
VROXWLRQQRWSUHFOXGLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIXVLQJLWLQWKHIXWXUH+RZHYHULWFDQ
have adverse implications in the medium term.
The problem is that over the past seven to eight years, the allocation of bud-
get expenditures has deteriorated: the proportion of productive expenditures 
has diminished, and the proportion of unproductive ones has increased9. To ad-
dress the long-term challenges of the country’s socioeconomic development, 
the economy needs investment in human capital and transportation infrastructure, 
as these public expenditures increase potential growth. At the same time, it is 
these sectors that lose the most from sequestration.
Further sequestration of expenditures without structural reforms (including 
reforms for budget-funded organizations) is posing grave risks for the country’s 
economic, social and political stability in the coming years (2017–2020). Without 
VWUXFWXUDOUHIRUPV¿VFDOSROLF\ZLOOORVHWKHOHHZD\WKDWPD\EHQHHGHGLQ
and 2018, and the positive macroeconomic effects of devaluation will be offset.
Under these conditions, the allocation of budgetary expenditures is becoming 
DVLPSRUWDQWDVDZHOOEDODQFHGEXGJHWORZGH¿FLW$FKLHYLQJEDODQFHDWWKHH[-
pense of productive sectors threatens to start a vicious cycle: reducing spending 
on productive sectors will undermine economic development, thereby shrinking 
EXGJHW UHYHQXHV&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKHNH\REMHFWLYHQRZ LV WRRSWLPL]HH[SHQGL-
tures, i.e., to look for more sophisticated budget savings methods through struc-
tural and institutional solutions, rather than by mere sequestration.
In 2016, the government will have to resort to increasing the federal budget 
GH¿FLW LQ OLJKWRI VKDUSO\GHFUHDVLQJK\GURFDUERQSULFHV ,W LVRIWHQQRWHG WKDW
low debt creates additional macroeconomic problems, particularly by depriving 
the monetary system of adequate collateral instruments. Proposals have even been 
PDGHWRVHWDÀRRUIRUWKHQDWLRQDOGHEWUDWKHUWKDQDFDS³DWOHDVW´LQVWHDGRI
“not more than” a certain level)10. This is hardly possible or feasible. On the one 
KDQG5XVVLD ODFNV D VLJQL¿FDQW DPRXQWRISULYDWH VDYLQJV WKDW WKHVWDWH FRXOG
borrow without prejudice to private investments, let alone the transition to direct 
IXQGLQJRI WKHEXGJHWGH¿FLW WKURXJKPRQH\FUHDWLRQE\ WKH&HQWUDO%DQN2Q
the other hand, given Russia’s unfavorable “credit history,” a substantial increase 
LQERUURZLQJVZLOOOHDGWRWKHLUVLJQL¿FDQWDSSUHFLDWLRQ,QRXURSLQLRQHQVXULQJ
macroeconomic stability means a rather long period of low debt for Russia.
7KHEXGJHWVLWXDWLRQUHPDLQVGLI¿FXOWIRUWKHVXEMHFWVRIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ
Although actual tax revenues have fallen in real terms, the debt situation had not 
 9 For more information, see Idrisov and Sinelnikov-Murylev (2013).
 10 7KH6WRO\SLQ&OXE¶VSURSRVDOVSXEOLVKHGLQDXWXPQVWDWHWKDW³WKHVKDUHRIGRPHVWLFQDWLRQDOGHEW
VKRXOGQRWIDOOEHORZRIWKH*'3LQWHUPVRIWRWDOERUURZLQJV´6WRO\SLQ&OXES
16 90DX5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
GHWHULRUDWHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\)LJ7DEOH1RPLQDOLQFRPHJURZWKSUHYHQWVXQ-
controllable developments. A slowdown was observed in spending growth within 
the consolidated budgets, which increased by only 1.4% (93% of budgeted ex-
penditures were actually made).
A further deterioration of revenues will most likely lead to the need to raise 
WD[HV7KHRI¿FLDOSRVLWLRQVUHPDLQLQWDFWUHJDUGLQJWKHLPSHUPLVVLELOLW\RIUDLV-
ing taxes during times of crisis and maintaining a moratorium on decisions in 
WKLVDUHDXQWLO+RZHYHULQFHUWDLQVLWXDWLRQVUDLVLQJFHUWDLQWD[HVPD\EH
a more appropriate solution than sequestration or increasing domestic debt.
Monetary policy.7KHWUDQVLWLRQ WRDÀRDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHIRU WKHUXEOHKDV
saved the foreign exchange reserves, which in itself is important for long-term 
economic development. Raising the discount rate was also an important and re-
VSRQVLEOHGHFLVLRQGHVSLWH¿HUFHFULWLFLVPIURPDVLJQL¿FDQWVHJPHQWRIWKHSR-
litical and business elite. It is equally important that V. Putin has repeatedly spo-
NHQ DERXW VXSSRUWLQJ WKH5XVVLDQ&HQWUDO%DQN¶V SROLF\0RQHWDU\ DXWKRULWLHV
FRQWLQXHWRVKRZVXSSRUWIRUWKHJRDORIEULQJLQJLQÀDWLRQGRZQWRE\
thereby creating qualitatively new business conditions.
,QDGGLWLRQWRPDLQWDLQLQJUHVHUYHVWKH&HQWUDO%DQN¶VSROLF\KDVFRQWULEXWHG
WR UHGXFLQJFDSLWDOÀLJKWDOWKRXJKPXFKRI WKHRXWÀRZUHVXOWHG IURP5XVVLDQ
Fig. 4. 'HEWRIWKHEXGJHWVIRUVXEMHFWVRIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ58%ELOOLRQ
6RXUFH Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.
Table 4 
Main types of tax revenues included in consolidated budgets for subjects of the Russian Federation in 2015 (%).
 Main types of tax revenues Share in tax and  
non-tax revenuesIn nominal terms In real terms*
Tax and non-tax revenues 6.2 –5.9 100.0
Individual income tax 4.3 –7.6 36.8
&RUSRUDWHLQFRPHWD[ 7.3 –4.9 27.6
Property tax 11.6 –1.1 14.0
Excise duties on excisable goods 1.5 –10.1 6.4
Small business tax 10.4 –2.2 4.6
*LYHQWKH&3,IRU
6RXUFH)HGHUDO7UHDVXU\5RVND]QD5RVVWDW$XWKRU¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
1790DX5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
ERUURZHUVSD\LQJRIIIRUHLJQGHEWV7DEOH7KXVLQWKHQHWRXWÀRZRI
capital equaled USD 57 billion (USD 153 billion in 2014). The main channel 
IRUFDSLWDORXWÀRZVZDVWKHQHWUHSD\PHQWRIOLDELOLWLHVWRQRQUHVLGHQWVZKLFK
GURSSHGE\86'ELOOLRQFRPSDUHGZLWK86'ELOOLRQLQ+RZHYHUZH
FDQDVVXPHWKDWFDSLWDOÀLJKWZDVDOVRGULYHQE\JHRSROLWLFDOIDFWRUVDVFRQFHUQV
about potentially expanding the sanctions could have made foreign investments 
less attractive. In particular, this is illustrated by the decline in foreign direct in-
vestments from USD 18 billion in 2014 to USD 7 billion in 2015.
The propensity towards the “dollarization” of savings also decreased, as 
KRXVHKROGUXEOHDVVHWVJUHZVLJQL¿FDQWO\IDVWHUWKDQIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHVDYLQJV
Although Russian banks, companies and households (in terms of foreign cur-
rencies) increased investments in foreign assets in 2014, foreign assets held by 
Russian residents declined slightly in 2015 amid the intensive external debt re-
SD\PHQW,QWKHPDLQFKDQQHOIRUFDSLWDOÀLJKWZDVWKHJURZWKLQIRUHLJQ
assets (by USD 116 billion, including USD 30 billion of investments in foreign 
currencies in cash), which declined by USD 7 billion in 2015. This decline is al-
most entirely due to reduced investments in foreign currencies in cash.
7KHVHYHUHFULWLFLVPRIWKHSROLF\SXUVXHGE\WKH&HQWUDO%DQNZKLFKLVRIWHQ
blamed for all of the problems with the Russian economy, seems unfair. Paradoxi-
cally, those who particularly criticize the “monetarists” turn out to be true mone-
tarists in practice, as they exaggerate the ability of monetary authorities to neutralize 
negative impacts from the external environment or geopolitical crises.
Banking reform. The banking sector remains a focus for the authorities. 
On the one hand, the efforts to clean up have continued. Licenses were with-
drawn from 93 credit organizations (86 in the previous year). Financial recovery 
( rehabilitation) procedures were initiated for 15 banks in 2015. The total assets 
for banks that lost their licenses in 2015 were not very large, as they accounted 
for approximately 1% of the total assets in the banking sector.
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGVRPHRIWKHPDMRUEDQNVKDYHUHFHLYHGVWURQJ¿QDQFLDOVXS-
port from the state, as the crisis in the banking sector would have led to dire con-
sequences, not only economic but also social and political. Most of the govern-
ment support went to state-owned banks, which strengthened their positions in 
major segments of the banking services market.
Lending to businesses slowed but still showed a positive trend of almost 7%, 
and the indebtedness of individuals declined by about the same amount, a much 
milder reaction than in 2009. The quality of bank loans does raise concerns, how-
ever. Past due debts held by corporations under ruble loans have already reached 
Table 5
&DSLWDORXWÀRZ86'ELOOLRQ
Indicator 2014 2015 
1HWFDSLWDORXWÀRZIURPWKHQRQJRYHUQPHQWDOVHFWRU –153.0 –56.9
Liabilities to non-residents (“+” means growth) –36.7 –64.3
FDI in the non-banking sector 18.5 6.7
Other liabilities –55.2 –71.0
Including foreign debt repayment according to schedule –208.3 –126.4
New borrowings 153.1 55.4
)RUHLJQDVVHWV³±´PHDQVJURZWK³´PHDQVUHGXFWLRQ –116.3 7.4
6RXUFH%DQNRI5XVVLD
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the high set in 2009, and the individual debts broke record values. The quality of 
loans continues to deteriorate in all segments of the market.
7KHJUHDWHVWSUREOHPLVVWLOOSRRU¿QDQFLDO UHVXOWV LQ WKHEDQNLQJVHFWRUDQG
losses of a large number of banks. In 2015, almost 30% of operating banks re-
corded losses, compared with only 11% in 2009. In contrast to the situation six 
\HDUVDJRWKHFXUUHQWGHFOLQHLQEDQNLQJSUR¿WPDUJLQVZDVFDXVHGQRWRQO\E\
deteriorating asset quality and the need to drastically increase spending on pro-
YLVLRQLQJEXWDOVRE\ORZHUSUR¿WPDUJLQVRQFRUHEDQNLQJRSHUDWLRQV7KHODWWHU
was due to the high-interest-rate policy. The value of bank liabilities proved to be 
more sensitive to increases in the discount rate than the returns on loan portfolios, 
UHVXOWLQJLQDVLJQL¿FDQWUHGXFWLRQLQRYHUDOOQHWLQWHUHVWLQFRPH
The social situation and the labor market. In 2015, as in previous post- Soviet 
crises, incomes decreased against the relative stability in the labor market. 
Unemployment hovered at approximately 5.5%, which is higher than the US 
¿JXUHEXWFRQVLGHUDEO\ORZHUWKDQWKH(XURSHDQOHYHO,QDWHQVHGHPRJUDSKLF
situation, and with the decline in the working-age population, businesses are 
hesitant to severely reduce employment, instead trimming working hours and 
payments.
:HOOEHLQJGURSSHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\GXULQJWKH\HDUZLWKUHDOGLVSRVDEOHLQFRPH
GHFUHDVLQJE\DQGUHDOZDJHVE\PRUHWKDQ7KLV¿WVLQWRWKH³5XVVLDQ
labor market model,” i.e., reducing wages rather than employment.
$WWKHVDPHWLPHEDQNVDYLQJVKDYHLQFUHDVHGPRVWO\LQUXEOHV7KLVVLJQL¿HV
a transition from consumption-driven to savings-driven behavior, which is an ad-
ditional factor slowing down the economy in the short term, as demand becomes 
even more limited, but the crisis-related uncertainty does not encourage the trans-
IRUPDWLRQRIVDYLQJVLQWRLQYHVWPHQWV&RQVHTXHQWO\UHWDLOWUDGHWXUQRYHUIHOOE\
approximately 9%.
As a result, the poor population began to grow rapidly. The share of Russians 
in the poor category returned to the level of the mid-2000s (20.3% with income 
below the subsistence level). This is a new phenomenon in recent years. In 2008 
DQGGHVSLWHWKHGHFOLQHLQ*'3WKLV¿JXUHZDVKDYLQJVLJQL¿-
cantly decreased afterwards (Table 2). At that time, the state possessed conside-
rable budgetary savings (the Reserve Fund), which were allocated to maintain 
WKHVWDQGDUGRIOLYLQJ7KHHFRQRP\KDGWRSD\IRUWKLVZLWKDEXGJHWGH¿FLWRI
RI*'3 LQZLWK WKHQRQRLO GH¿FLW UHDFKLQJD UHFRUGEUHDNLQJ
Those resources are no longer available in the budget.
Researchers have begun to note the erosion of the middle class within 
the country (Maleva, 2015, pp. 12–13), although one needs to distinguish be-
WZHHQWKHSUREOHPVRIFDVKÀRZVUHGXFHGFXUUHQWLQFRPHDQGUHVHUYHVDFFX-
mulated well-being, behavioral stereotypes). The crisis has led to a certain reduc-
WLRQLQLQHTXDOLW\ZLWKWKH*LQLFRHI¿FLHQWGHFUHDVLQJIURPWRDQG
WKHGHFLOHIXQGVUDWLRIURPWR0DOHYDSS±+RZHYHUWKLV
can hardly be called a positive trend.
3. Priorities for anti-crisis policies
Russia’s economic policy is facing two key challenges: starting economic 
growth and dampening reductions in household well-being. These challenges are 
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FRUUHODWHGDVWKH¿UVWOHDGVWRLQFUHDVHGZHOOEHLQJDQGWKHVHFRQGJHQHUDWHVGH-
mand for economic growth.
Solving these tasks is tricky because we are facing a structural crisis rather 
than a cyclical one. The end of the downturn, which cannot last long (much less 
forever), in this case does not automatically restore growth. Unless we make 
special efforts to build a new growth model, the potential for growth will remain 
low, which means that the economy will hover around zero (or within statistical 
error). Unlike a recession, this may last long enough for the political elite to form 
a model suitable for modern challenges, with the respective impact on well-being 
and social stability.
The most serious challenge facing Russia is not overcoming the recession but 
achieving economic growth. Of course, we mean sustainable, long-term growth 
accompanied by structural modernization, rather than achieving good-looking 
statistics. In the foreseeable future, Russia must strive for growth rates exceeding 
WKHZRUOGDYHUDJHRUVRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQWKRVHRI*HUPDQ\DQG&KLQD
This is not a trivial task and has no standard solutions, unlike stabilization. 
Solutions will be contingent upon the features of the current era and our country. 
An answer to this challenge requires major institutional reforms in all spheres of 
society, not exclusively in the economy.
We suggest the following key points for economic policy that can solve both 
issues.
&RQVLVWHQWGLVLQÀDWLRQZKLFKLVDQDWXUDOEDVLVIRUORZHULQJLQWHUHVWUDWHVDQG
UDLVLQJLQYHVWPHQWDFWLYLW\LQ5XVVLDZLOODOVRJXDUDQWHHVRFLDOVWDELOLW\,QÀDWLRQ
must be brought down from 13% in 2015, to a target of 4% by 2017.
7KHVLWXDWLRQLVSROLWLFDOO\FRPSOH[DQGWKHUHLVDULVNRILQLWLDWLQJDQ³LQÀD-
WLRQDU\VSLUDO´$VLQWKHVDSRZHUIXOSURLQÀDWLRQJURXSLVIRUPLQJDJDLQ
$VEDFNWKHQWKHUHDUHWKUHHSRZHUIXOIRUFHVLQWHUHVWHGLQSUHVHUYLQJKLJKLQÀD-
WLRQEDQNVZKLFKJHWDGGLWLRQDORSSRUWXQLWLHVWRVROYHWKHSUREOHPVRIVWDELOLW\
WUDGHEHFDXVHLQÀDWLRQEHQH¿WVLQGXVWULHVZLWKDVKRUWWXUQDURXQGRIFDSLWDODQG
LQHI¿FLHQWHQWHUSULVHVIRUZKLFKFKHDSPRQH\PDNHVLWSRVVLEOHWRDYRLGRWKHU-
wise unavoidable changes in management and owners.
+RZHYHUVWDUWLQJRQWKHFRXUVHRIGLVLQÀDWLRQQRZZRXOGEHQH¿WERWKWKHDXWKR
rities and the majority of the public — ordinary businesses and citizens. A deter-
PLQDWLRQ WRUHDFK WKHWDUJHWRILQÀDWLRQZRXOGEHYHU\ LPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOO\
economically, and socially. Politically, it would make a very important argument 
in the presidential elections in 2018. Economically, the solution to this problem 
would allow business (if the authorities can demonstrate the seriousness of their 
intentions) to make plans, particularly investment ones. And socially, it would be 
DIDFWRULQUHGXFLQJWKHVRFLDOWHQVLRQWKDWDOZD\VDFFRPSDQLHVKLJKLQÀDWLRQ
'HFLVLYHGLVLQÀDWLRQQRZLVQRWRQO\QHFHVVDU\EXWSRVVLEOH,IRLOSULFHVVWD\
at the present level, Russia will in fact get rid of the Dutch disease. In previous 
\HDUVUHGXFLQJLQÀDWLRQZDVFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHULVNRIORZHUHGFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV
due to surplus (that is, not tied to the growth of labor productivity) strengthening 
RIWKHUXEOH1RZKRZHYHULQWKHDEVHQFHRIVLJQL¿FDQWLQFUHDVHVLQRLOSULFHV
these risks will not threaten the economy. It presents an additional stimulus for 
macroeconomic invigoration.
The effectiveness of budgetary policy is frequently brought up by Russian 
SROLWLFLDQV DQG HFRQRPLVWV KRZHYHU WKHDYDLODELOLW\ RI FKHDS PRQH\ RYHU
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the last ten years has not brought about the realization of these goals. We can see 
four options here: budgetary maneuvers, improvements in budgetary procedures, 
LQFUHDVHVLQWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKHEXGJHWQHWZRUNDQGFODUL¿FDWLRQVRIWKH¿V-
cal rules based on experience and current realities. A key here is the question 
RIWKHLQÀXHQFHRIVHSDUDWHEXGJHWOLQHLWHPVRQHFRQRPLFJURZWK,0)
Moreno-Dodson, 2013).
Over the past few years, the allocation of budget expenditures underwent 
negative changes. Expenditures that promote increasing reserves and the quality 
of factors of production (labor and capital) as well as the growth of total fac-
WRUSURGXFWLYLW\ WKHHI¿FLHQF\RI IDFWRUVXVHG LQSURGXFWLRQSULPDULO\ LQYHVW-
ments in infrastructure) have not increased, and in some cases have decreased, 
relative to GDP. The share of nonproductive expenses has grown — for defense, 
public administration, and law and order. This structural shift limits the ef-
IHFWLYHQHVVRIEXGJHW VWLPXODWLRQ VHH.QREHO DQG6RNRORY ,GULVRYDQG
Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2013, 2014).
7KHSURVSHFWVRI¿VFDOUXOHVDUHDVSHFLDOSUREOHP$VRLOSULFHVFRQWLQXHWREH
RQDORZWUHQGWKHLVVXHPD\QRWVHHPSHUWLQHQW+RZHYHULWPDNHVVHQVHWRGLV-
FXVVLW7KHDFWLQJ¿VFDOUXOHVZKLFKFDOOIRUPRYLQJUHQWLQFRPHLQWRVRYHUHLJQ
funds, were a reaction to the Soviet experience of completely spending all rent 
income, making the country vulnerable to shocks from changes in economic con-
ditions. The experience of 2009–2012 demonstrated serious drawbacks of this 
model: the presence of a “safety cushion” is a disincentive for modernization. 
$FULVLVLVDWLPHWKDWSXVKHV\RXWRZDUGPRGHUQL]DWLRQEXWD¿QDQFLDOUHVHUYH
allows you to continue in a business-as-usual mode.
We need to reexamine the very concept of using surplus income and, therefore, 
¿VFDOUXOHV*LYHQWKHUHDOLW\LQ5XVVLDLWZRXOGEHZLVHWRKDYHVWULFWHUJXLGH-
OLQHVGH¿QLQJWKHFXWRIISULFHIRUPDUNHWUHYHQXHVVHWWLQJLWDWDUDWKHUORZOHYHO
and balancing the current budget (that is, the budget of repeating obligations) at 
WKHOHYHORIUHYHQXHVWKDWDUHPRVWSURWHFWHGIURPWKHÀXFWXDWLRQVRIH[WHUQDOIDF-
tors. If there are additional rent revenues, they should be used for a development 
EXGJHWWKDWLVWR¿QDQFHH[SHQVHVZLWKD¿QDOWLPHKRUL]RQ7KLVPRGHOZRXOG
allow more active investment in development when the market is good, and would 
not create the temptation to pour money on problems when there is a crisis.
Support for non-oil exports is currently another important priority. Today, it is 
IDVKLRQDEOHWRVSHDNRILPSRUWVXEVWLWXWLRQ+RZHYHULWLVQRWWKHVDPHDVIRLVW-
ing on people low-quality domestic products at a high price, especially when their 
SURGXFHUV DUHGHPDQGLQJ¿QDQFLDO DLG IURP WKHEXGJHW7KH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\
PD\EHQH¿WIURPLPSRUWVXEVWLWXWLRQEXWWKHW\SHWKDWZRXOGEHFRPSHWLWLYHLQ
an open market. In other words, it is important to stimulate export-oriented im-
port substitution. The support for non-oil exports and for import substitution must 
go hand in hand.
Several conditions must be met for this to occur.
First, there should be no obstacles for non-oil exports. Yet, despite calling for 
stimulating exports, there is more talk about tariff and non-tariff restrictions. Just 
in the last few months, decisions have been made to limit grain exports, and there 
is discussion about limiting metal exports as well. These could easily be followed 
by limits on chemical exports and so on. The problem is understandable: under 
GHYDOXDWLRQH[SRUWVEHFRPHPRUHDWWUDFWLYHZKLFKOHDGVWRSUREOHPVRI¿OOLQJ
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í
WKHGRPHVWLFPDUNHW+RZHYHU WKHVH FRPSOLFDWLRQV RQO\ SRWHQWLDO LQ SDUW DV
demand within the country is also falling) should not be a reason to reject im-
provements in the structure of Russian exports. There are enough levers to supply 
the domestic market without obstructing the foreign expansion of our producers.
6HFRQGRQHVKRXOGQRWFUHDWHH[SRUWRIIVHWVDUWL¿FLDOEDUULHUVWRNHHSIRUHLJQ
competitors out of the Russian market. The present exchange rate is an adequate 
barrier to protect domestic manufacturers, although imported goods, paradoxi-
cally, could help price stability in a number of ways.
Third, it is important not to interfere with the efforts by domestic companies 
to improve and restructure. This will be accompanied by a rationalization of em-
ployment, which for all its pain would be a very important element in moderni-
zation. Rationalization is important both for export-oriented companies and for 
companies that are primarily focused on import substitution.
Attracting private investment (domestic and foreign) once again becomes 
a priority in economic policy at both the federal and regional levels. When rent 
UHYHQXHV ZHUH KLJK WKLV ZDV OHVV LPSRUWDQW EHFDXVH WKHEXGJHW LQÀX[ FRXOG
compensate for gaps in the investment climate. Russia’s improved position in 
WKH'RLQJ%XVLQHVVUDWLQJVLVDQLPSRUWDQWEHQFKPDUN+RZHYHULQWRGD\¶VJHR-
SROLWLFDOVLWXDWLRQLWVVLJQL¿FDQFHLVH[WUHPHO\OLPLWHGDQGFRQGLWLRQDO
Authorities at all levels must orient themselves towards attracting investors, 
just as the authorities of Novgorod Oblast did in the 1990s and of Kaluga or 
8O\DQRYVNREODVWVGLGZLWKLQWKHODVW¿IWHHQ\HDUV7KLVPXVWEHRQHRIWKHNH\
parameters in assessing the effectiveness of regional administration, no less im-
portant than salaries in the budget sector.
Deregulation, protecting the rights of entrepreneurs, and developing small and 
medium business are different but closely connected economic policy priorities. 
Legislation should be favorable for business, helping to attract entrepreneurs rather 
than repel them. Yet, even at the level of naming regulations, we can see a worsen-
ing attitude toward entrepreneurship. In the past, the law was called “On protect-
ing the rights of companies and individual entrepreneurs when implementing state 
FRQWURORYHUVLJKWDQGPXQLFLSDOFRQWURO´'HFHPEHU1R)=QRZ
the draft law is called “On federal, regional, and municipal control.” Naturally, 
the point is not in the name but in the practice, which is in no way favorable to 
EXVLQHVVDFWLYLW\GHVSLWHWKHLPSURYHGVWDWXVRI5XVVLDLQWKH'RLQJ%XVLQHVVUDW-
ing, and the President’s direct instructions “to lift restrictions on business maxi-
mally, freeing it from obtrusive oversight and control.” In this regard, we should 
return to the approach in the Gref Program, prepared in 1999–2000, which out-
OLQHGVXEVWDQWLDOVLPSOL¿FDWLRQVLQOLFHQVLQJDQGH[SDQGHGWKHUROHRILQVXUDQFH
A complex of measures stimulating competition must be elaborated. This is of 
particular importance in the current macroeconomic and geopolitical situation, 
when devaluation and sanctions limit access to competing goods and services in 
the domestic market. The policy of stimulating competition should be considered 
the equivalent of a policy limiting monopolies, which in some cases are in com-
plete contradiction. Today, Russia needs a competitive policy and not a “struggle 
against monopolies,” which is often understood as curtailing those who have 
achieved market success.
The list of problems has not exhausted the modernization agenda during this 
crisis. Other important institutional and structural reforms are needed in human 
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FDSLWDO HGXFDWLRQ KHDOWK SHQVLRQ V\VWHP ZKLFK LQYROYHV VRFLDO ¿VFDO DQG
investment factors. Russia needs new approaches to social policy, foreign eco-
nomic activity, and spatial development.
Thus, a key challenge for the coming period (2017–2019) will be to create 
a mechanism to recover economic growth while avoiding populist scenarios. 
The way this issue is resolved will have a huge impact on the life of Russia in 
the post-crisis world, the contours of which are being shaped as we speak.
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